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IN THE

·SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE INSUR.A.NCE FUND,
administered by the Con1mission 'Of
Finance of Utah,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THO!tiAS L. DYI{ES, THE INDUSTRIAL C011NIISSION OF UTAH,
and INTERniOUXT.A.IN S E RVICE BUREAU, INC., doing business as ~ferchants Police,
Defendants.

No. 7196

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
Tl-IE ST.A_TE IXSl-:-R . .\.NCE Fl1 XD,
athninistered by the Counnission of

Plaintiff,
YS.

TI-!0:-.L~-\S

r .. DYI(ES,

TilE INDUSTRL.:\_1 .. C():JfjiiSSIOX OF UTAH,
and T~\1.,-ER~lOlTXT.L'\.I~ S E R\~ICE J)ITRE.A_l~, INC., doing busi~
11(-'~.~ a~ :\Ierchants Police,
Defendants.

No. 7196

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
-

·sTATE~iENT

\\T e haYe recently been supplied with a copy of the
1\ ttorney General's brief, \Yhich he has entitled DE FEN-

DANT 'S BRIEF and in \Yhich he defends the Industrial
Connnission 's deeision in this case. After reading the
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cont(•nts of his brief, we are not sure \Vhether it is supposed to defend the defendant, Intern1ountain Service
Bureau, Inc., but it is quite apparent that his brief
atte1npts to sustain the Industrial Comn1ission's a\Yard
against the State Insurance Fund. We notice that the
Attorney General accepts the statement of facts as given
in our brief. which we filed with the ,Supreme C~ourt on
August 13, 1948. -\V e shall herein call attention to certain
inferences of facts eontained in the Attorney_ General's
brief \Yhich are not supported by the evidence in the
case.
In our main brief ''Te discussed three points,"' Point
No. 2 being that the Industrial Commission's decision
was an1biguous, uncertain and incomplete. The Attorney
General's brief eontains no argument relating to that
point. Therefore, we presume that the Attorney General
is \Yilling to adn1it that the It1dustrial Con1mission 's
decision -w·as an1biguous, uncertain and incon1plete in the
particulars which we n1entioned in our brief. We called
attention to the failure on the part of the Industrial
Commission to make any finding of fact or conclusion
of law relating to workmen's compensation insurance
coverage by the State Insurance Fund of Mr. Dykes'
employer, the Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc. The
Attorney General's brief has attempted to supply a
finding of fact relating to this point. We do not know
whether hi~ finding is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the Industrial Commission should have made
the finding. But there can't be much argument against
what we said about the ambiguity and uncertainty of the
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Industrial Connnission 's decision. It speaks for itself.
In our orig·inal Brief '(page 8), and in the Attorney
GPneral"s Brief, the provision conta~ned in the State
Insurance Fund's policy eoYering J. l\Inrtin Stoek fro1n
.Aa~·n~t :20, 1946, to June 30, 1947, is quoted:
··If the ernployer shall transfer his or its
o"-nershi1) o1· 01h?:;·a tion of the business insured
by th:s lJolicy, this poliry shall autoinatically beeoiile cancelled.'' ( Tr. 51.)
-

L

\Ye argued that this provision ~uton1atically tern1inated

:Jlr. Stock's policy 'Yhen he transferred his o-vvnership
a11cl operation of the business as of July 1, 1947, unless
there \Yere cireun1stances ,,-hich -vvould VJlork an estoppel
n~n~1~ll:'t the Fund Hpplying that provision. We called
attention to the fact that neither J\1r. Dykes nor anyone
else alleged or proved that there were any such circumstances. The Industrial Comn1ission did not find any
facts \Yhich \vould \York such an estoppel. And the Attorney General's brief does not mention any such facts
or circumstances as would constitute an estoppel. However, he argues that the above-quoted provision of the
policy did not operate to terminate ~the policy eoverage
on July 1, 1947, because Mr. Stock became an officer
of the corporation, Intermountain Service Bureau, and
perhaps held some stock interest in the corporation, and
tha~· those facts are sufficient to constitute Mr. Stock as
the "O"\vner" and "operator" of the corporation, and
therefore there was no "transfer" of Mr. Stock's "own(~rship" or "operation" of the businesfS, contrary to Mr.
Stock's testimony. (Tr. 66.)
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As the basis for his conclusion, the Attorney General has surmised that Mr. Stock "was undoubtedly. a
prominent factor, if not the full owner and 1nanager of
the new company"; although in the same paragraph he
adn1its that "ther,e is no evidence in the record to sho\Y
the respective interests of any stockholders in the ne\v
con1pany." Where, then, does he have any basis for
assuming or surmising anything at all relating to the
stock o'vnership of the corporation~ It vvould be just
as reasonable to assu1ne that Mr. Stock's ov,'"nership of
the corporation's stock was on an equal basis w~th each
of the other incorporators, one of whom was Mr. Earl
J_jowry, who vvas the General Manager of the corporation,·
and who hired Mr. Dykes in August, 1947. (Tr. 42.)

.

In several respects, more or less in1portant, the
Attorney General's argument contains erroneous statements of the evidence. He says, ''The new con1pany continued under the same name (Merchants Police) ''Tith no
change in address, telephone number or telephone listing and \vith little or no ch~nge in letterheads or in n1ethods of operation.'_ ' The record shows that the corporation had a brand new name, Intermountain Service Bureau. ( Tr. 62, 63, 65, 66 and Defen.dant 's Exhibit 4.)
It also show·s that Mr. Stock had conducted his business
in the Atlas Building; but the Corporation had its offices
in the Hooper Building at 23 East 1st South. ( Tr. 51
and 52.) There is no .testimony as to the telephone nunlber before the incorporation or afterwards; but the Salt
Lake City telephone book shows the name and nu1nber
of the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, ''rhich w·erP not
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listed or slunYn in the telephone book pr1or to July 1,
1947. ,,. . e agree that the naine, "l\ferchant's Police" is
~till listed in the telephone book as it \Yas prior to July 1,
19·±"4, because that is one of the trade na1nes used by the
Interinountain SerYice Bureau for part of its business
operations. (Tr. 64, 65, 66.) It no\v has a different
nun1ber than prior to July 1, 1947.
The _,__\ttorney General's Brief also says, "nor vVas
it sho\Yn at any tiine in the record that the new corprr.:.
ration had any !:lSsets. '' \\' e can just as truly ren1ark
that there \Yas no evidence in the record to indicate that
the corporttion did. not have a great wealth of assets.
_;;_:\pparently the corporation had_ enough assets to be
concerned \Yith \Yhether the Industrial Commission might
1nake an R\Yard against the corporation; because the
corporation hired its own attorney to represent it in ;the
hearing and to resist the claim on the merits. (Tr. 1 and
•
2.) There is absolutely nothing in the· record to indica~te
that the eorporation cannot readily pay the amount of
the Industrial Con1mission's award to Mr. Dykes. In
fa;_-t, if the Industrial Commission's decision were sustained, it \Vould force the State Insurance Fund to pay
the a\'.Tard, instead of requiring payment to be made
b~T the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, where the liability
properly belongs.
The Attorney General's Brief says, "It is a well
accepted principle of law that the corporate entity will
be disregarded by the courts vvhen jus~tice requires it.''
But he did not point to any evidence in the record which
"\vould require the disregard of the corporate entity of
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the Intern1ountain Service Bureau in this case. Among
other citations of authorities, he n1entions 13 An1. Juris.,
page 160, §7. V7 e here quote from that authority:
''The doctrine that a corporation is a legal
entity existing separate and apart from the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced for
the purpose of convenience and to .-subserve the
ends of justice. The concept cannot, theref,oTe,
be extended to a point beyond its reason and
policy, and when invoked in support of an end
subversive of this policy, \\Till be disregarded by
the courts. Thus in an appropriate case and in
furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation
and the individual or individuals owning all its
stock and assets will b-e treated as identical, the
corporate entity being- disregarded 'vhere used
as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality.''
( Fron1 here on is considerable discussion regarding the questi,on of legality of mortgages,
stock issue!' and corporate actions which n1ight
have the effect of defrauding creditors.)
It plainly can be seen that such a rule has no application to t~e situation in our present case. There was no
allegation of illegality in the forming of the Intermoun..
tain Service Bureau; there was ~o evidence that anyone
was defrauded or misled by the formation or the existence or the op'erations of this corporation; and the
Industrial Connnission 's decision contains no· findings
that there was any fraud or .misrepresentati,on or misleading actions by or on account of the corporation.
The case of Putnam vs.- Indust·rial Commission, 80
Utah 187, 14 Pac. (2nd) 973, did not involve a corporation, but it did involve a situation which is somewhat
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interesting in connection 'vith our present discussoin.
Tht• Industrial Conunission there held that the injured
nu1n "~as in the en1ploy of ''the City
aste Paper Campa ny and/ or L ...A.. Putna1n' ~ and that a certain contract
,\~hich '• atteinpted to n1ake F. D. Gray an independent
c·ontractor is a n1ere subterfuge designed to evade and
defeat the provisions ·of the \V- ork1nen's Con1pensation
.A.et. '' The Industrial Comn1ission 's award against '',the
City \\~ aste Paper Con1pany and/ or L. A. Pu~nam'' vvas
annulled by the Supren1e Court, as not being justified
hy the evidence in the record. At page 210 of the Court's
op1n1on 1~ the following:

''r

''Thus, '""hen the whole ·of the testimony is
considered-as the conm1ission was required to
consider it-and undue weight not given to mere
snatches ,o.f it to -t.he exclusion of other evidence
of equal if not greater in1portance, it is clear no
finding is justified that the City _Waste Paper
Con1pany vvas '' ovvned'' by Putnam, or that the
busines.s after January 5th or 6th was operated
by hi1n or h;.'" the City \Vaste Paper Company.''
By the san1e kind of reasoning, it can be said here that
neither the Industrial Commission nor the Attorney
General are justified in finding that the business of the
corporation, the Intern1ountain Service Bureau, vvas
"o'vned" or "onera ted" bv J. l\1artin Stock· in the
n1onths of August !Or }J oven1ber, 1947, when ~1r. Dykes
was hired and injured respectively.
L

~

The Putnan1 case also contains a pertinent discussion of the an1biguous expression, ''and/ or'' which is
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found in .t\YO places in the Industrial Commission's decision in the Dykes case.
The argun1ent contained on the second question in
the Att1orney General's brief relates to a consideration
of "Exhibit B," \vhich \vas introduced into the record
by the presiding con11nissioner over our objection. (Tr.
55 and 63.)
e put son1e discussion regarding this exhibit in our original brief commencing at Page 14. As
-vve stated there, we did not consider that this exhibit
"\Vas properly a .part ~of the record in the case, because
it haq no applicability to the situation involved here.
This exhibit does not need to be considered by the Court
unl~ss the Court should agree with the Attorney General's argun1ent on the preceding point to the effect that
the State Insurance Fund policy covering J. :.M~artin
Stock, an individual, must automatically cover the corporation, Intern1ountain Service Bureau, Inc., which was
his business successor.

''T

We have called a tt~ntion to the wording of Exhibit
B, which referred only to ''insurance companies''; and
to the fact that the State Insurance Fund is not an insurance company. We have also c-alled attention to
various sections in Title 42, Chapter 2, of the Utah Code
Annotated, which provide for premium payments and
· ter.mination of Fund policies in an entirely different
1nanner than that which applies to policies in private
insurance companies. In his brief the Attorney General
has sin1ply ignored the references which \Ve made to
Sections 42-1-49, 42-2-3, 42-2-4, 42-2-7 and 42-2-11 of the
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Utah Code ~\.nnotated. In the latter part ·of his brief he
quotes the "~ording of section 40-1 9-1~~ of Chapter G3,
La\Ys of Utah 1947, \Yhich rPads as follo\Ys:
..c\.11 insurance con1panies \Yriting ,,·orlnnen 's
compensation insurance and occupational disease
insurance in thi~ state and the Connnission of Finance in oonnection \\~ith its adininistrati,on of
the State Insurance Fund, shail be subject to the
rules and regulations of the Industrial Con1n1ission. Said C'onunissio.n nzay pro vide the n~ethods
to be used by tlzenz -in the pay1Jtent of co?npensation and benefits. The Industrial Con1n1ission
may provide uniforn1 rates to be charged by such
companies but such rates need not be uniforn1
'vith the rate·s fixed for the State Insurance Fund.
Prior to the year 1941, \Yhen the State Insuranee
Fund was under the adn1inistrati~on of the Industrial
Con1n1ission, Section 43-3-38 read as follows:
All insurance con1panies- _writing W orkn1en's
compensation insurance in this state under the
terms of the title Industrial Commission, shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of the industrial commission. Said commission may provide
uniform .rates to be charged by such companies
and the· methods to be used by them in the payment of compensation and benefits, but such rates
need not be uniform with the rates fixed for the
state insurance fund,
1

The c~anges made by the 1941 Legislature transferred from the Industrial Commission to the Finance
Commission the matter of making premium rates for
the State Insurance Fund. But the povver to 1nake
premium rates f.or ''insurance eompanies'' was left vvith
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the Industrial Com1nission. And the n1ethods to be used
by insurance companies and the State Insurance Fund
in 1naking payn1ent of con1pensation and benefits were
left under the authority of the Industrial Con1n1ission.
In vie'v of the changes \V hich the 1941 Legislature
1nade in the sections of Title 42, Chapter 2, renl'oving the
adn1inistration of the State Insurance Fund fron1 the
Industrial Con11nission,-· the 1niddle sentence of Section
43-3-38, (which in 1947 becan1e Section 43-19-13 as aboveInen tioned) :
Said Connn,ission rnay provide the 1nethods to
pe used by thent in the payrnent of co1npensation
and bene fits,
a very good exan1ple of a statute in \vhich the rule,
".<expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is applicable
It is even n1ore clear-cut than the statute involved in the
case of ]Jansen vs. Board of Echtcation) 101 Utah 15,
116 Pac. (2nd) 936.
IS

The Legislature has provided in Section 42-2-3:
The con1mi ssion of finance shall adn1inister
the state insurance fund, \Vrite con1pensation insurance therein, conduct all business thereto appertaining and belonging, and do any and all
things in connection \Vi th all insurance business to
be carried on, supervised or controlled by the comn1ission of finance agreeably to the provision of
this title, and it is vested with full authority over
said fund..
This and the other sections of the san1e chapter, are
inconsistent with the Industrial Com1nission exercising
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·supervision or control over the cancellation or terinination of .State Insurance Fund policies. The provisions of
the section quoted by the ..._-\..ttorney General do not apply
to the State Insuranee Fund except as to the 'JJtethods
to be used in the pay nz ent of con~pensatiou and benefits
under the \Yorkn1en 's con1pensa.tion and occupational
disease la\YS.
There are certain 1nis-staten1ents of facts in the
.Attorney General's brief, relating to the i11atter of cancellation or termination of State Insurance Fund_ policies.
On Page 2 of his brief he declares that the State Insur~
ance Fund made no effort to advise the Industrial Conlnrission of the lapsation of the policy _of J. Martin Stock,
operating as Merchant Police. This is contrary to the
reeord. The State Insurance Fund did send to the Industrial Commission copies of each of the notices \vhich
"\vere sent to the policy holder to the effect that his poilcy
had been cancelled. (Tr. 48-51, and Deft's Exhibits 2
and 3.)
The State Insurance Fund has always followed the
practice of sending copies to the Industrial Commission
of the notifications that policies have been canc~lled.
Such copies are sent to the Commission immediately
after the cancellation takes place.. Therefore, the Industrial Commission has it within its power to take such
steps as it deems proper, to prevent an employer from
operating his business with three or more employees,
without procuring workmen's compensation insurance
to cover his employees, as provided by the statutes.
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Asstuning, for the purpose of further discussion,
that the Supre1ne Court 1night hold that our argument
i~ not \Yell taken ,,~jth respect to any of the points \Ve
l1aYe heretofore discussed, there are tV\ro further matters 'vhich \Vould be proper to consider, relating to Exhibit B.
Exhibit B is, on the face of it, a motion passed by
the Industrial Con1n1ission on October 14, 1947. It purports to he and clearly \vas intended to be a general order
of the Industrial Coinrnission, inasn1uch as it atten1pts
to apply certain rules generally to all insuJ;ance coinpanies \vriting \Vorkmen 's con1pensati!on insurance. Section 42-1-19 reads as follovvs:
All general orders of the co1nn1ission shall
take effect thirty days ·after their publication,
unless 'Other,vise provided, and special orders
shall take effect as therein directed. The comn1ission shall, upon application of any employer
or any person, grant an extension'"' of time for
co1npliance -vvith any order, if it finds such extension of tin1e necessary.
Ina~1nuch

as T~Jxhibit B, being a general order of the
Indnstrial Con11nission, did not specify any date ,,. hen
it should beco1ne effective, it \vould take effect t~irty
da~-s after its publication. Theref1oTe, its effective date
could not be prior to N ove1nber 13, 1947. Even if the
State Insurance Fund's policy covering J. Martin Stock,
doing business as Merchants Police, could be construed
as ren1aining in force after July 1, 1947, it was cancelled
n1idnight N oven1ber 12, 1947, by reason of ~the notice of
intention to cancel which had been previously mailed
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to ~Ir. Stock by the State Insurance Fund. (Tr. 48, 49,
53, 37.) Consequently~ under no theory or application
of any of the n rgn1nent contained in the A~ttorney General's brief could the tern1s of the Industrial Conunission's order (Exhibit B) be construed as applying to the
policy \Yhich eoYered J. ~Iartin Stock, doing business as
nierchants Police. That policy \\"a.S already cancelled
before the· effectiYe date of the Industrial Conunission's
o_rder.
Even if the argtmlent of the Attorney General was
-accepted to the effect that the policy covering~ J. Martin
Stock must autoinatically continue to cover his successor,
the Intermotmtain Service Bureau, Inc., and even though
that policy \Yould have remained in force until midnight
November 12, 1947, under the possible theory abovenlentioned, this policy eould not have covered the hernia
w·hich ~Ir. Dy~es claiined he sustained in the course of
his employment for the follovving reasons: In his application for compensation he -mentioned haviiig had tvvo
accidents, one on the night of N'ovember 11, 1947, and
the other one on the evening of November 25, 1947. His
testimony at the hearing quite clearly shows that he did
not sustain any hernia as the result of the accident vvhich
occurred on the night of November 11th. He testified
that he had a fall on November 11th which knocked his.
breath out and this accident got his uniform all dirty.
(Tr. 16, 17 and 23.) He also testified that it was the
accidental fall which he received on the evening of November 25th which caused him to have a pain in his·
groin and which' apparently resulted in his hernia. (Tr.
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17, 18 and 30.) There is no possible theory by which the
State Insurance Fund's policy covering J. Martin Stock
could be construed as being in force and covering this
accident on November 25, 1947.

For the foregoing reasons the a''Tard of the Industrial Con1mission should be annulled, insofar as it applies
to the State Insurance Fund.
Respectfully sub1nitted,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorney· for Plaintiff.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

